For 20% of a sample of 1,078 violent incidents reported in British bars and pubs, another incident was reported at the same premises within 6 months. Log-survival analysis revealed nonrandom sequences that demonstrate a system memory effect separate from any biases involving particular venues. The rate of reoccurrence was not constant during the 6 months following incidents but was significantly higher for Weeks \-$, approximated to the mean value for Weeks 5-12, and declined for Weeks 13-26. Reoccurrence was particularly likely in the first 3-4 days after an incident. Risk of reoccurrence was further increased for incidents that involved either threats or the exit and return of the assailants within that original incident. Results support the view that "violence breeds violence" and demonstrate the need for increased staff vigilance for up to 12 weeks following a violent incident, and particularly during the first few days and weeks.
The received wisdom concerning violence embraces many beliefs that have not been tested scientifically on hard data, and the growing concern for the serious problem of work-related violence (Flannery, 1996; VandenBos & Bulatao, 1996) has not always been matched by an adequate body of research. Recently, however, there have been encouraging developments in experimental and social psychology (see, e.g., Leather, Beale, Lawrence, & Dickson, 1997; Leather & Lawrence, 1995) and in epidemiology through the collection of large bodies of data (see Kraus & McArthur, 1996; Nigro & Waugh, 1996) . It is now becoming more feasible to carry out systems identification studies to discover the characteristics of the processes underlying violent incidents. As each feature is revealed, the set of possible processes becomes smaller, until finally the real mechanism can be specified in detail. The details of the process then guide the search for suitable countermeasures. This challenging of received wisdom is important for safeguarding the physical and psychological health of workers and is in the spirit of the United States' national strategy, proposed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, for the prevention of work-related psychological disorders (Sauter, Murphy, & Hurrell, 1990) , as discussed by Beale, Cox, Clarke, Lawrence, and Leather (1998) .
The feature that this article seeks to question is whether the "mechanism" of pub violence exhibits system memory, that is, whether the past influences what happens next or whether each day is a "whole new ball game." There is some anecdotal evidence that "violence breeds violence," but few studies have adequately described the occurrence of events in time or established a pattern of reoccurrence. The study described here addressed this problem by using log-survival techniques to analyze the time intervals between reported incidents at the same venues to determine whether the reoccurrence of incidents occurs in ways that are not random. If such nonrandom incidence is found, then it should be possible to identify those times when the risk of reoccurrence is highest. Note that this is a separate matter from the occurrence of relatively more violence in some times and places than in others. In just the same way, a dice may show more or less sixes than chance variation could explain, but quite separately (and much more remarkably) could also show its sixes bunched together in time. It would then be showing a system memory, with or without the separate feature of bias. The two issues should not be confused. Previous studies of violence have often claimed to show memory when in fact they have only shown bias.
The possibility of a system memory effect for violent incidents is suggested by social interactionist theory, which makes the point that violence often originates in simple grievances and disputes that escalate over time into something more . The potential for violence, in other words, is a fact within the system of social relationships. The public house or bar, which is the setting for the incidents in the present study, is an environment in which the origin or escalation of disputes is particularly likely.
There is much evidence of an anecdotal nature to suggest that violent incidents at a particular venue occur in clusters. For example, managers of pubs and bars in the London area of the United Kingdom surveyed by Hillas, Cox, and Higgins (1988) stated: "Violent outbursts tend to be grouped together, one often leading to another, thus I may have 3 incidents in a week, then none for a month" (p. 9) and "Incidents tend to come and go in cycles. It's possible to go six months with no incident and then have three in one week" (p. 9). Such perceptions, however, are not necessarily evidence of memory because such groupings would occur as a result of random fluctuation and bias alone. It is necessary to test whether such groupings occur significantly more often than expected when bias has been taken into account.
These pub managers also appeared to be aware that they were more likely than normal to experience another such incident in the near future (Hillas et al., 1988, p. 17) : "Yes, people are afraid it may happen again" and "Nobody likes drinking in a rough pub where a fight can start any minute." Furthermore, they thought that trade was affected by such incidents, with 45% of managers claiming that their takings dropped. "Bad reputation, 'good' customers leave, creating a 'void', violence attracts violent people" (p. 17). For the majority of these, this effect only lasted for one or two nights, but in some cases the effect lasted longer.
Although there is a body of anecdotal evidence concerning the reoccurrence of incidents at particular venues, few hard data have been collected. The most closely related body of evidence regarding the reoccurrence of violent incidents concerns the victims of assault, who have been shown to be at increased risk of suffering another attack.
Such evidence comes, for example, from the National Institute of Education's Safe School Study Report to the Congress (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institute of Education, 1978) . The report, based on a survey of 4,000 schools in the United States, found that although teachers in general were not in much danger of being attacked or robbed at school, the risk of further victimization faced by teachers who had been victimized once increased dramatically. Teachers in general had a 1 in 125 chance of being robbed in the 2-month survey period; those who had also been attacked had a 1 in 8 chance of being robbed. Female teachers who had been attacked faced a chance of being raped that increased from less than 1 in 1,000 to almost 1 in 10. It is likely that these results reflected the fact that some teachers who were personally vulnerable, or who worked in very violent schools, were attacked repeatedly, therefore having a greater risk of being attacked at any time. The results give no information about increased risk for teachers regarding the timing of previous incidents, and so cannot be used to infer that one attack increases the likelihood of a second. Again, what has been shown is probably bias, not necessarily memory.
The 7992 British Crime Survey (Mayhew, Aye Maung, & Mirrlees-Black, 1993) revealed that, in approximately 1 year, 32% of victims of assaults in and around work and 39% of victims of pub fights were victimized more than once. However, once again there is no information about the timings of the repeat victimizations in relation to previous victimizations. Brown, Bute, and Ford (1986) reported that, in a postal survey of U.K. social workers, 29% reported being the victim of at least one assault over the preceding 3 years. Of these, 61% had been assaulted more than once, which suggests that victims of one assault were more likely to be the victim of a further assault. Breakwell and Rowett (1989) found a similar effect in that, of the 25% of social workers who reported being assaulted at least once in the previous 5 years, 40% had been assaulted more than once. Again there is no information on the times between the assaults.
Violence in B?ars and Licensed Premises
Violence in licensed premises poses a significant threat to the health and safety of staff, customers, and the general public as is demonstrated by a variety of national statistics. In the United States, the rate of workplace homicide for bartenders is over three times "the national average for workers in general (Jenkins, 1996) . In New Zealand, Chalmers, Fanslow, and Langley (1995) reported that 10% of hospital admissions because of injuries from assault as well as 9% of homicides occurred on licensed premises. The 7992 British Crime Survey (Mayhew et al., 1993) revealed that 16% of incidents of violence occurred in pubs and clubs, and the 7996 British Crime Survey (Mirlees-Black, Mayhew, & Percy, 1996) indicated that one third of assaults by strangers and one fifth of assaults by acquaintances occurred in or around licensed premises. Also in the United Kingdom, Shepherd, Scully, Shapland, Irish, and Leslie (1988) reported that 39% of injuries from assault presenting at an inner-city hospital for treatment occurred in or around licensed premises.
Such statistics provide an impetus for researchers of many disciplines to learn as much as possible about the characteristics of violence in bars and pubs in order to reduce the problem. In particular, it is important for pub and bar managers, their staff, and their employing organizations to have available as much information as possible to help them manage the problem effectively (see Beale et al., 1998; Leather, Cox, & Farnsworth, 1990 ). The present study should help to prepare staff who have suffered one incident for the likely timing and nature of a further incident. Beale et al. (1998) demonstrated that over a quarter (28%) of violent incidents reported to have occurred in British pubs and bars involved some follow-up or continued action after the assailants had exited the premises. The present article examines evidence of an increased likelihood of further violence for the weeks following the initial incident, either from the original aggressors or from other sources. It reports a study of reported violent incidents that were followed by a further such incident within 26 weeks (6 months). The .primary objective was to identify the tell-tale signature in the timing of further incidents that indicates that a memory effect is at work. A secondary objective was to identify any features of initial incidents that increased the likelihood of reoccurrence and any common features of the subsequent incidents.
The sampling period of 26 weeks was chosen initially as an informed guess, which turned out to be correct. The techniques we used were initially devised for analyzing life span data, and all that matters in choosing the sampling period is that it is long enough to capture most of the time intervals in question. A study of human mortality could follow a cohort of individuals for 100 years or 1,000 years-it would make no difference. The pattern, and the people, would have died away in the first 100 years, and further observation would be fruitless. In a similar way, we assumed in this study that any repeat incidents that occurred in pubs would happen within 6 months, after which any further events would show random temporal spacing (that is to say, constant probability with respect to the interval since the last event).
Method

The Violent Incidents
The violent incidents were taken from the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report System that operates within Allied Domecq Retailing (ADR), the major international food and drinks retailer. ADR has around 13,800 retail outlets worldwide, at least 5,500 in the United States. Its 4,000 pubs and bars in the United Kingdom are spread throughout England, Wales, and Scotland and include a wide variety in terms of size, location, and clientele. Around 2,440 of these houses are run by managers employed by ADR rather than self-employed tenants. The reporting system is an integral part of ADR's ongoing procedure for monitoring problems in its retail outlets. It was established in 1989 to fulfil one of the recommendations of a violence audit, which showed that the majority of pubs experienced little physical violence, but that for a small number there was a significant problem (Hillas et al., 1988) . The working definition of violence used for the reporting system includes nonphysical as well as physical violence: Any behavior deliberately intended to damage staff or customers (or pub/brewery property) either physically or psychologically (through abuse or threat).
When a violent incident is reported in one of ADR's managed houses, a security manager visits the pub to investigate and interview the pub manager and other employees involved. These people then assist the security manager in completing the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report Form (KPP IRF) that is sent to the Incident Report Centre at the University of Nottingham. Analysis of the incident reports, involving over 230 variables extracted from the KPP IRFs, provides information that is fed back to occupational health practitioners, health and safety officers, trainers, security personnel, and higher management.
There is no perfect way of gathering information about large numbers of violent incidents, as has been discussed by Beale et al. (1998) , who also considered the merits and limitations of reporting systems. This article describes a small part of the ongoing study of the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Reporting System designed to extend the usefulness of reporting systems in ways that have not previously been explored. Other analyses have examined the nature of the incidents in more detail than can be given in this article (see, e.g., (Beale, 1999; Beale et al., 1998; Lawrence, Beale, Leather, & Dickson, 1999) .
In looking at the timing of incidents, the present study required data from a reporting system that was both well established and stable, and from January 1992 to June 1995, this system did remain stable in terms of the numbers, types, and geographical location of incidents reported. Organizational restructuring of ADR toward the end of 1995 caused a short period of disruption to the system and so prevented the study being extended.
All incidents that were reported to have occurred during the 3-year period from January 1992 to December 1994 were used as initial incidents in this study. Any incident that occurred at the same premises within 26 weeks of an initial incident was used as a subsequent incident. Subsequent incidents, therefore, could occur from January 1992 to June 1995. To be considered as a subsequent incident rather than as follow-up action that was part of the initial incident, the second incident had to have been reported in a separate report form (see Beale et al., 1998) . Subsequent incidents were included whether or not they were reported to be directly related to the initial incident.
The terms initial and subsequent refer simply to the order of any pair of incidents occurring consecutively at the same premises. Thus, for example, if there are three incidents at the same premises within the study period, the second incident may be the subsequent incident in one pair and the initial incident of the next pair. This is appropriate for time interval analysis, which does not require the first event of the sequence under study to be special or different in any way. The technique is routinely used for ongoing series of events such as feeding and fasting in animals, and the series can be picked up at any point. In no way does the validity of the technique depend on measuring from the first ever feed. In log-survival analysis, an initial event is simply the first of any pair of successive events from which the time interval is measured to the next or subsequent event. That event may then be used in turn as the initial event of the next time interval, and so on.
The 26-week (6-month) time limit for reoccurrence was chosen for two reasons: (a) It provided an optimum number of initial-subsequent incident pairs within the 3.5-year period of stability for the reporting system, and (b) it was a sufficiently long time period to display the expected patterns of reoccurrence. This was an initial parameter estimate to guide the search for a temporal signature. Our results confirmed that the 26-week estimate was appropriate.
Analysis
The two main objectives of the analysis were (a) to examine the timing of reoccurrences and (b) to explore the nature of initial and subsequent incidents.
Timing of subsequent incidents. This analysis was carried out using a log-survival technique, which was originally devised to analyze ecological data, particularly life span data (Clarke & Grassland, 1985; Hutchinson, 1978) , and is well established in medical epidemiology (Lee & Go, 1997; Marubini & Valsecchi, 1995) and engineering (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980) . The technique is applicable to any set of data in which two well-defined events follow each other with a measurable time interval between. These events may be different, such as death following birth or a particular operation, or they may be similar, for example, the use of a particular letter or word in language.
If the probability of the second event occurring is constant irrespective of the time since the first event (i.e., reoccurrence occurs at random), the plot of the percentage of survivors against time shows an exponential decline, so a plot of the log of the percentage of survivors against time is a straight line with negative gradient. This can be referred to as the "memoryless property of the exponential distribution" (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980, p. 22) ; in other words, the timing of the second event is unaffected by what has occurred previously.
For each week up to 26 weeks, following each initial incident that occurred between January 1992 and December 1994, the log of the percentage that had not yet been followed by a subsequent incident was calculated. In this case, Iog 10 was used, although the technique can utilize any base for the log. The log percentages were then plotted against the number of weeks. If the pattern of reoccurrence had been random over the 26 weeks, the resulting graph would be a straight line. Any section of the graph showing a steeper negative gradient indicates an increased likelihood of the subsequent incidents occurring in that time period.
For each week after the initial incident, a weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence was estimated by dividing the number of initial incidents surviving to the beginning of that week without reoccurrence by the number of subsequent incidents occurring during that week.
When interesting results were obtained from the 26-week analysis, a similar analysis was carried out for the 15 days following each initial incident to obtain a more detailed picture for that period. Daily hazard rates for reoccurrence were also calculated for this period.
Nature of initial and subsequent incidents. The second set of analyses aimed to explore the effect of any system memory found in the time interval analysis in terms of the nature of the initial and subsequent incidents in a pair. To explore the nature of initial incidents that made a subsequent incident more likely, we compared the characteristics of incidents that were followed by another incident within 26 weeks (initial [followed] ) with those that were not (initial [not followed]). To explore how the nature of incidents that followed other incidents might be affected, we compared the characteristics of incidents that followed another incident within 26 weeks (subsequent) with those that did not follow another incident within that time (not subsequent). To ensure accurate discrimination between subsequent and nonsubsequent incidents within the study period, we also had to take account of incidents that occurred during the 6 months prior to the main study period, that is, July to December 1991.
The characteristics of incidents were described in terms of 15 dichotomous variables that indicated the presence (1) or absence (0) of a particular feature in the report of an incident. These variables were chosen from over 230 available from the system as representing general features of incidents in terms of what happened rather than characteristics of particular venues or individuals involved. Also included was a seriousness score assigned by the reporting licensee with a range of 0 (trivial) to 10 (the most serious you could ever imagine). It has to be acknowledged that this is a crude measure, but it is rarely practical to include sophisticated measures in operational reporting systems. These variables are described in Table 1 . The time between incidents at the same premises was represented by two variables: days to subsequent incident and days since initial incident. £ Two main analytical techniques were used: survival analysis and correlation procedures. Survival analysis was used to examine the whole sample of initial incidents and the rates over time at which they were followed by subsequent incidents. This analysis compared sets of incidents according to control variables and so identified any characteristics of incidents that displayed significantly different reoccurrence patterns over the 26-week period. The statistical package SPSS, which was used for the analysis, uses (a) the actuarial method described by Berkson and Gage (1950) to compute the survival functions and (b) the Wilcoxon (Gehan) statistic (see Cox & Oakes, 1984; Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980) to determine whether groups differ significantly in terms of survival. The phi similarity coefficient (range = 0-1) was chosen •for the majority of correlation analyses, which involved two dichotomous variables. Pearson product-moment correlation was used for those analyses that involved variables whose distribution approximated sufficiently to normal: seriousness (N = 746,kurtosis = -.680, skewness = -.105) and days to subsequent incident/days since initial incident (N= 220, kurtosis = -.886, skewness = .594). The variables that were examined are given in Table 1 . It is important to note that the repercussion variable relates to whether the incident report stated that the incident was directly linked to a previous problem event at the premises. This previous event might be a reported incident or might be an event that was not reported, perhaps because it was not, of itself, sufficiently serious.
Results
Timing of Reoccurrences
There were 1,082 reported incidents occurring between January 1992 and December 1994 in the 2,440 managed houses, giving a mean weekly rate of occurrence per house of 0.0028. Of these reported incidents, 220 (20%) were followed by another reported incident at the same premises within 26 weeks (6 months), at a mean weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence of 0.0087. The number of weeks from initial to subsequent incident at the same premises, the weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence, and the log of the percentage of survivors (i.e., initial incidents that have not yet been followed by a subsequent incident) for each week are shown in Table 2 . The log of the percentage of survivors was plotted against the number of weeks since the initial incident. The w resulting plot, shown in Figure 1 , was concave or positively skewed (Hutchinson, 1978) , showing that the incidents were clumped; that is, short intervals were more common than in the random case (Clarke & Grassland, 1985) . The graph showed a steeper negative gradient than that of the straight line corresponding to random reoccurrence for around the first 4 weeks, then had a similar gradient for Weeks 5-12, then generally a less negative gradient for Weeks 13-26.
The weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence for the 1st week was significantly higher (p ^ .001) than for the other weeks and that for the 2nd week approached significance (/>£.!). When compared just with the weeks that followed, the rate for the 2nd week was significantly higher (p < .01), as were the rates for the 3rd week and 4th weeks (p s .05). It can be seen that the weekly hazard rate for Week 1 (0.0351) was around 6 times as great as the mean weekly hazard rate for Weeks 13-26 (0.0055) and around 12 times as great as the overall mean weekly rate of occurrence per house (0.0028). It appears then that the risk of a reported incident occurring shows around a 12-fold increase for the 1st week following another reported incident at the same premises. If this week is survived without incident, this risk is halved for the 2nd week and further reduces for subsequent weeks survived.
A similar procedure was applied to the 56 incidents (5%) that were followed by a subsequent incident within 15 days (a fortnight, counting the day of the initial incident as Day 1) at a mean daily hazard rate of reoccurrence of 0.0035. The numbers of days from initial to subsequent incidents at the same premises are shown in Table 3 . The log percentage survival plot, shown in Figure 2 , is again concave. The graph falls more steeply than the corresponding straight line graph for the first |-4 days (including the day of the initial incident), the daily hazard rates for reoccurrence for the first 2 days being significantly higher (p :£ .01) than for the other days. The plot also displays an increased negative gradient for the 8th Number of weeks from initial incident day (i.e., the same day of the following week). The increased daily hazard rate for reoccurrence for the 8th day becomes significant (p £ .05) when compared with the days still to come. However, the numbers of incidents occurring per day, by this stage, are very small and the conclusions must be tentative. Together, these plots provide strong evidence of an increased risk of a subsequent violent incident being This figure does not include renewed violence that occurred as "follow-up action" to the initial incident and was reported on the same report form. * p £ .05. ** p < .01, one-tailed test. Asterisk in parentheses indicates that the hazard rate is significantly different from those for larger intervals only. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Number of days from initial incident reported up to around 12 weeks following an initial incident. The risk of reoccurrence is higher in the first 2-4 weeks and particularly high during the first 3-4 days and again 1 week after the initial incident.
These results cannot be accounted for by the possible inclusion of a small number of premises that reported a very high frequency of reoccurrence throughout the study period. The average times between reported incidents for those houses that experienced two or more incidents is given in Table 4 . It can be seen that only 8 premises displayed an average time between incidents within the 26-week reoccurrence time considered, and that none fell within a 15-day reoccurrence time. Furthermore, when the 14 houses with the highest frequency of occurrence (i.e., five or more incidents in the study period) are excluded from the analysis, the pattern remains very similar in nature (see Figures 3 and 4) .
Nature of Initial Incidents
Survival analysis produced information about the characteristics of initial incidents that affected the rates of reoccurrence. It was found that the rate of reoccurrence was decreased (Wilcoxon T = 5.468, df= I, p £ .05) for initial incidents in which the assailant made a physical attack while being ejected from the premises. Number of weeks from initial incident Figure 3 . The log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial incidents over a period of 26 weeks for houses experiencing four or fewer incidents.
Incidents that were followed by another incident within 26 weeks (initial [followed]) were less likely to involve an attack during ejection (<j> = -.0716, N = 1,082, p s .05) than were those that were not followed by another. Initial incidents that involved a threat (r = -.1398, N = 220, p < .05) or in which assailants returned later (r=-.1340, N = 220, p £ .05) were followed by a subsequent incident within a shorter time. Initial incidents that involved damage to property (r = .1196, N = 220, p < .1) were followed by a subsequent incident after a slightly longer interval. Number of days from initial incident Figure 4 . The log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial incidents over a period of 15 days for houses experiencing four or fewer incidents.
Nature of Subsequent Incidents
Rates of reoccurrence were higher for those subsequent incidents that were reported as repercussions than for those that were not (Wilcoxon T= 20.198, df=l, p^ .001) and were lower for subsequent incidents that involved interventions by staff (Wilcoxon T = 4.079, df= 1, p ^ .05), attacks on staff (Wilcoxon T= 17.821, df= I, p < .001), attacks during ejection (Wilcoxon T = 3.822, df=l, p < .05), injury to staff (Wilcoxon T = 7.615, df= 1, p < .01), and injury to customers (Wilcoxon T = 3.689, df= !,/><.05).
Subsequent incidents were more likely to be reported as repercussions than were other incidents (4> = .1332, N = 940, p :£ .001) and were given higher seriousness scores (r = .0936, N = 940, p s .01). They were less likely to involve an attack on staff ( Subsequent incidents that occurred sooner were marginally more likely to be reported as repercussions (4) =-.1209, ./V =220, p^.l), were less likely to involve fights (<J> = .2247, N = 220, p ^ .001), and were marginally less likely to involve fights that continued outside after the assailants had exited (4> = .1220, N = 220,p < .1).
Discussion
The results presented here clearly indicate that, when a violent incident is reported, there is an increased likelihood that a further incident will be reported within a few weeks. Although there can be no absolute certainty that this reflects the actual occurrence of incidents, as opposed to the way in which they are reported, the differences in character between the initial and subsequent incidents found in this study provide evidence that the results do not arise purely from a reporting effect.
Furthermore, different reporting effects might influence the results in opposing ways. It might be argued, for example, that the increased reporting soon after an initial incident could be explained by a familiarity or accessibility effect, that is, that a pub manager who has recently been in touch, or is still in touch, with the security manager regarding one incident will be more familiar with the process and will find it easier to report again something that might otherwise have gone unreported. This effect would be expected to diminish over time and thus cause an increased reporting of incidents in the short term. However, it could equally be argued that the converse is true. Pub managers who have recently reported an incident might feel that reporting another one very quickly would give the impression that they cannot control the premises, and therefore they do not report incidents that they might otherwise have done.
Another explanation for the apparent clustering of incidents of violence could be specific periods or events that are triggering factors, for example, Christmas or New Year. One licensee surveyed by Hillas et al. (1988) explained "The pub has a tradition for violence at Christmas" (p. 9). This, however, cannot be the explanation for the results found in this study because for only two of the pairs of incidents did both occur within the Christmas to New Year period.
Leaving aside any reporting effect, the results provide clear evidence of an increased risk of the reoccurrence of violence within 6 months once an initial incident has occurred. One fifth (20%) of all the reported incidents were followed by a further incident within 6 months (26 weeks). The risk is particularly great in the first few days following an initial incident and exactly 1 week later. The increased risk is statistically significant for up to 4 weeks and remains detectable for up to 12 weeks but diminishes as the weeks progress.
It has to be remembered that this increased risk demonstrated over the first few days is in addition to any continued or follow-up action reported on the same form as the initial incident. Such action has previously been shown to occur in over a quarter (28%) of incidents that involved both a physically violent act and problems with customers during opening hours, that is, in around 24% of the total incidents reported (Beale et al., 1998) . Taken together, these two sets of results provide an impetus to take very seriously the aftermath of violent incidents in terms of the increased likelihood that further violence will occur.
It was not always clear from the incident reports whether the second incident was directly related to the initial incident. There are a number of ways in which it might be expected that further violence could be engendered. First, the original aggressors (or their victims) might want to complete "unfinished business" or to retaliate for perceived unfair treatment (Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) . Second, associates of either the aggressors or the victims might similarly retaliate. Third, other customers might "have a go," Tiaving been given the impression that this is a location where violent behavior is the norm or can produce benefits to the perpetrator (Leather & Lawrence, 1995) . Fourth, pub staff might be particularly anxious after an initial incident and overreact to any minor infringements of their house rules. The only features of initial incidents that appeared to increase the likelihood of reoccurrence were (a) threats of further action and (b) return of the assailants more or less immediately to cause more trouble, which was reported as part of the original incident. Both these were associated with reoccurrence after a short time interval. These findings confirm that staff need to be particularly alert for reoccurrence if threats have been made (i.e., not all threats are empty threats) and also indicate that if assailants have returned within a few hours of the initial incident to cause further trouble, they are likely to return again during the next few days.
The main features of initial incidents that were associated with a decrease in the likelihood of reoccurrence were an attack during ejection and an attack on property. Damage to property and an attack on the outside of the premises while leaving had marginal effects. These findings might be rationalized as assailants having their feelings of aggression satisfied by an immediate physical outburst on the premises or while leaving, then feeling no need to take it further, or, alternatively, being afraid or ashamed to return. This does not mean, however, that staff do not need to be vigilant after such a physical outburst because the survival analysis still shows high weekly hazard rates for the weeks following such incidents.
One salient feature of subsequent (reoccurrent) incidents was, not surprisingly, that they were more often seen as repercussions from previous problems at the premises than were other incidents. In general, they were also given higher seriousness scores than other incidents. The seriousness score is a useful, if crude, measure of the licensee's subjective evaluation of how serious the incident was. It might be speculated that there is a "mere frequency effect" in that licensees may begin to feel more vulnerable and at risk on the basis of repeated incidents, even though the subsequent incidents did not appear to be more severe on more objective grounds, such as attack on, or injury to, staff. Put simply, successive incidents might generate more of the "what if" questioning that is known to be a part of posttrauma reactions (Scott & Stradling, 1992 ). Elsewhere we have demonstrated the existence of a link between actual or anticipated violence and decreased well-being (Leather et al., 1997) . From a practical point of view, this reinforces the need, when considering the psychological health of people involved in violent incidents, to treat subjective evaluations as seriously as more objective ones (Wykes, 1994) .
The findings that subsequent incidents were less likely to involve attacks on staff and injury to staff were a little surprising given that such incidents were more likely to be regarded as repercussions. In the whole sample, correlation analysis indicated that incidents regarded as repercussions were marginally more likely to involve attacks on staff (r = .0553, N = 1,091, p s .1). This indicates that there must be a number of reported incidents involving attacks on staff that were regarded as repercussions from previous problems that had not been considered sufficiently serious to be reported. Such a finding emphasizes the need for staff to be alert for repercussive action after apparently minor incidents as well as after more serious ones.
Subsequent incidents were also less likely to involve injury to customers, interventions from staff, attacks during ejection, and, marginally, planned attacks and attacks on the outside of the premises while leaving. These features were all negatively associated with incidents regarded as repercussions, so these findings are more in line with expectation. They could indicate that staff are reluctant to get involved in problems, having already experienced a previous incident, or that some reoccurrent incidents that were also repercussions had no obvious build-up but occurred as soon as the assailants entered, so that staff did not have time to intervene. Subsequent incidents that involved fights and, marginally, fights continuing after ejection were less likely to occur after shorter time intervals than other reoccurrent incidents.
This study has succeeded in its primary objective to provide evidence that, following a reported violent incident at a particular venue, the likelihood of further violence occurring at that venue is not constant over time but is particularly high during the first few days and weeks following the incident and diminishes over time. In other words, violent incidents within the social environment of the pub or bar exhibit system memory with respect to their timing. This finding provides support fpr the widely held belief that "violence breeds violence" at a particular venue and provides information that can be used in the prevention of violence at work by alerting staff to the period when there is an increased likelihood of violence occurring, which may be as long as 12 weeks after an initial incident.
The study has also provided further support for organizations to maintain internal violent incident reporting systems that go beyond the legal requirements of national reporting, as advocated by Beale, Cox, and Leather (1996) and by Nigro and Waugh (1996) . The type of work reported here and by Beale et al. (1998) is only possible if an organization's records cover a wider range of incidents and contain more details about those incidents than are required by national reporting.
